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The segmentation of global manufacturing and services provided China and 
subsequently India with a golden opportunity to make full use of their absolute 
advantage—low cost yet educated labour—to integrate into the world economy within a 
comparatively shorter period of time than some earlier industrialisers. Though 
international trade functioned as a vent of surplus in view of the narrowness of their 
domestic markets at the beginning of their economic catch-up, the label of export-led 
model may not reflect the real picture as imports underwent dramatic increases during 
their respective growth periods, in particular for China. Foreign direct investment has 
played a pivotal role in their economic growth and has major presence in international 
trade and investment in leading sectors of both countries, giving rise to certain special 
features and weak links for their economic expansion and sustainability of fast …/   
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economic growth. To maintain more broad-based, fast and balanced growth, it seems 
that both countries have to redress sectoral imbalances, encourage technology upgrading 
and cope with future changes in demographic profiles which constituted a trigger to fast 
economic growth at the time of their respective economic reform.  
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1 Introduction 
The outstanding economic growth of China since the 1980s and India since the late 1990s 
has been the subject of countless analyses. Compared with earlier industrialization, these 
two populous countries began their ‘catch-up process’ from low starting points.
1 In terms 
of per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted), China in 2006 reached the level comparable with Japan 
in the mid 1960s and Korea in the mid 1980s. Meanwhile, India reached the same level as 
Japan in the mid 1950s and Korea in the mid 1970s. However, as China and India 
together account for two-fifths of the world population, their achievements have had 
global repercussions on trade, economic growth and poverty reduction. Being the third 
largest importer and exporter, China has already been exerting considerable influence on 
world prices of commodities and manufactured goods. 
A partial answer to the question of sustainability may be derived from a comparison of 
the current experiences of China and India with those of Japan and the Republic of 
Korea some decades ago when they began their catching up processes. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 examines 
the special characteristics of China and India during their fast growth episodes, in 
particular how the engines of growth came into being and propelled fast GDP growth. 
Section 3 looks into the down sides, structural imbalances and problems that China and 
India have had to address in order to maintain sustained, fast economic growth. 
Section 4 summarises the major findings. 
2  Specific features of fast growth in China and India 
2.1  Manufacturing and tradable services as their respective main engines of 
economic growth 
When China and India started their pro-market economic reforms, the world economy 
was undergoing a major structural change. Technology advances, particularly in 
information and communication technologies (ICT), have drastically changed the 
structure of global production and trade. International production became segmented or 
modularised. Vertical specialization allows various production activities to be carried 
out in different countries. The economic downturn in the late 1990s and the burst of the 
IT bubble further promoted companies to enhance capital mobility in order to 
materialise cost cutting. While labour was still the least internationally mobile factor of 
production, capital and intermediary products flowed to where labour was abundant and 
cheap. The segmentation of global manufacturing and services provided China, and 
subsequently India, with a golden opportunity to make full use of their absolute 
advantage—a low cost yet educated labour force, and to integrate into the world 
economy. 
                                                 
1 Loosely defined as a period of sustained rapid growth in per capita real income. A doubling of the 
growth rate of developed countries, 2.4 per cent per annum over the last 35 years, is considered as ‘rapid’ 
while 20-25 years is deemed as ‘sustained’ (Kolodko 2002; Wan 2004).   2
According to Kaldor (1967), manufacturing is an engine of economic growth as industrial 
goods have a higher income elasticity of demand, particularly in world markets. Indeed, 
GDP growth in earlier industrialisers was largely driven by manufacturing. After all, the 
growth potential of labour productivity in manufacturing is much higher than that in the 
agriculture or service sectors. Thus, an expansion in manufacturing is more likely to lead 
to a dynamic profit-investment nexus and faster growth of GDP. This is consistent with 
the Verdoorn’s law, which states that growth in industrial productivity and industrial 
output are positively correlated (Verdoorn 1949, 1980). 
For a large and populous country like China, manufacturing also has a significant 
impact on employment, as it requires intermediary products, capital goods, 
infrastructure and services for its expansion. Its development is, thus, essential for 
providing jobs for millions of underemployed urban and rural people. The emphasis on 
manufacturing was an important element of the development strategy for Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, who did not have other options: neither of them is well endowed 
with natural resources. Both have to, at least at the beginning of the catch-up period, 
mass manufacture to interact with the world extensively to get what they do not possess 
and make best use of their scarce resources. The spill over of manufacturing output and 
exports seems inherently more significant than that of primary products or services. 
Their experiences have demonstrated once again that, during the catch-up period, 
productivity improvement in manufacturing is usually faster than that in the total 
economy, and the value added in manufacturing usually grows more rapidly than GDP. 
This might explain partially why India has not been growing as fast as China.  
Figure 1 shows the average growth rates of value added in different sectors during the 
takeoff period.
2 It is clear that the growth rate in manufacturing is higher than those in  
 
Figure 1:  Average growth rate of GDP, value added in industry and services in the 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicators 
                                                 
2 Fast growth period for China is identified as from 1979 to the present and India from 1980 to the 
present, while for Japan from 1961 to 1974 and for the Republic of Korea from 1971 to 1995.   3
service and GDP for Japan, China and the Republic of Korea. For India, the growth 
rates are almost identical for manufacturing and for the whole economy. All four 
countries except India have pursued active industrial policy to boost target industries 
through trade and investment. Clearly, these highlight the importance of industrial 
policies in determining the position of manufacturing in the international division of 
labour and its competitiveness in the world market.  
Development of services in the leading economies normally began in earnest when they 
reached industrial maturity and growth in manufacturing started to slow down. 
However, India’s development path is unique. From 1981 to 2006, the service sector 
contributed 55.3 per cent while industry contributed 25.6 per cent to GDP growth.
3 
Globalization of tradable service is an important reason for this phenomenon. Since the 
later half of the 1990s, cheaper communications and advances in computer technology 
have transformed many service products from non-tradable to tradable. With the help of 
cross border trade, more work can be performed remotely, e.g., software coding, 
offshore call centres, filing tax returns, processing insurance claims, updating annual 
audits, preparing presentations and the like. As with globalization of manufacturing, 
more and more companies are moving sophisticated activities to cheaper locations 
overseas. With its pool of low cost, educated, English-speaking labour, India, in 
imitation of what China did with manufactured goods, has grabbed the opportunity and 
inserted itself in the service supply chain. As a result, the service sector has experienced 
extraordinary growth. The information technology, software, and business-process-
outsourcing sectors are at the high end of its productivity spectrum. Communication and 
banking rank first and second in terms of increase of investment as well as productivity 
growth, which are closely related to rapid growth of international trade and FDI inflow. 
In 2006, services accounted for 50.4 per cent of GDP. It is noted, however, that the 
expansion in the service sector, largely private sector driven, could not have happened 
without deregulation and other domestic reforms. Compared with external demand 
changes, supply side improvements are more important in initiating and maintaining the 
service boom. 
India's service sector during the past two decades has exhibited maverick performance. 
Its six to eight per cent growth is not particularly strong when compared with the 
growth rates of the service sector in China during the same period or in Japan during its 
catch-up period (10 and 9.2 per cent respectively). The service dominated GDP growth 
in India is due to the smaller contribution of industry to GDP, rather than extraordinary 
growth in the service sector. Should there have been a positive relationship between 
industry and service, the service sector in India might have grown even faster.  
2.2  Demographic changes as a trigger for economic growth 
Fast growth of leading sectors is normally triggered by greater factor inputs, e.g. capital 
and labour. So long as investment is sufficient to keep the ratio of capital to labour 
constant, a larger labour force with constant productivity means more outputs and 
higher per capita income. Under this circumstance, a greater working age population 
means faster expansion of manufacturing. When blessed with technological advances, 
                                                 
3 The source of data in this paper is based on the World Development Indicators unless indicated 
otherwise.   4
economic growth would accelerate further (Johnson 2004). In fact, fast economic 
growth in China and India, as was the case for Japan and the Republic of Korea, has 
coincided with the decline of the ‘age dependency ratio’. Japan’s fast economic growth 
was accompanied by a sharp decline in its dependency ratio from 68 per cent in 1950 to 
45 per cent in 1970 (Figure 2). Korea experienced a rapid decrease in the ratio from 87 
per cent in 1965 to 41 per cent in 1995. For China, the fall was from 78 per cent in 1975 
to 46 per cent in 2000 and for India from 77 per cent in 1975 to 64 per cent in 2000. It is 
interesting to note that after an extensive literature review, Mason (2003) concludes that 
‘changing demographics accounted for about one-third of East Asia's economic 
miracle’. 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and China not only had more human capital but it was also 
of higher quality than many other countries. Their literacy rates are much higher too at a 
similar stage of development. During the early years of their rapid growth, the literacy 
rate was 64 per cent (91 per cent in 2003) in China, and was 41 per cent (62 per cent in 
2001) in India. However, in 1980 the percentage of the population with a tertiary 
qualification was 5.3 per cent in India and 1.7 per cent in China, although the 
percentage of young people entering higher education institutions is higher in China 
than in India. In addition, the use of English as a primary language for higher education 
and research represents an apparent advantage for India. These are among the important 
reasons underlying India’s knowledge sector boom.  
It is important to emphasise that favourable domestic conditions, as discussed above, are 
dormant forces that do not automatically result in fast growth. Policy changes such as 
those taken by China and India, particularly relating to labour and private sector 
development, are necessary to maximise the rewards of demographic changes and to 
reduce negative impacts. An increase in the working population, if not accompanied by 
more job opportunities, will turn ‘the window of opportunity’ into a burden and a source 
of social instability. 
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Source: United Nations Population Division (UNPD), World Population Prospects   5
2.3  The important role of international trade: not necessarily export-led, definitely 
FDI-stimulated 
Trade plays an important role in the catch-up process, especially for countries starting 
from low levels of growth. Low per capita income at the early stages of development 
means that domestic demand is limited and thus must be compensated by exports 
(known as the ‘vent for surplus’) in order to gain economies of scale and enhanced 
productivity, and ultimately competitiveness in the world market. For China, though the 
large surplus of labour and FDI inflow have contributed to the sea change in its 
industrial structure, neither could help drive growth without foreign trade. This was 
particularly true before 1990. Trade expands demand together with investment and 
consumption and facilitates the formation of a profit-investment nexus and capital 
accumulation. Like Japan and the Republic of Korea, China has pursued a trade 
expansion policy in manufacturing products, despite being positioned at the lower end 
of the international supply chain and producing predominantly labour-intensive goods. 
India, in contrast with the other three countries, has focused on trade in services that 
accounts for about one third of its total exports. However, the share in service exports is 
not large enough to have a substantial impact on the aggregate trade share. According to 
WTO data, India’s combined market share in the world for its exports of goods and 
services was just 1.3 per cent in 2006.  
When examining the growth paths of these countries, much attention has focused on 
their exports, not imports. In reality, imports underwent dramatic increases during their 
respective growth periods for Japan, the Republic of Korea, China and India, along with 
exports. Even after becoming successful exporting economies, their imports remain 
significant. Over their respective 20 years of rapid development, India achieved 10.1 per 
cent and China 12.2 per cent annual growth in imports. More recently, from 2002 to 
2006, the share of imports in GDP rocketed from 23 per cent to 33 per cent in China, 
and from 15 per cent to 23 per cent in India. India’s growing import demand has been 
widely reported in the international press recently, signalling the coming of age of fast 
economic growth. With the expansion of imports, increase in exports is needed to earn 
sufficient foreign exchange and avoid a current account deficit. However, export 
capacity cannot be developed in the short term, as it requires human resources, 
infrastructure, technology and an enabling business environment. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that these countries occasionally suffered serious trade deficits.  
Foreign direct investment has played a pivotal role in the development of China’s 
manufacturing and India’s service industries. Likewise, foreign investors are major 
players in their trade. In China, foreign-funded enterprises account for around 60 per 
cent of its imports and exports. As for India, foreign investors are responsible for almost 
half of outsourcing services, although domestic enterprises dominate software exports. 
2.4  Investment-led growth and the role of domestic and external financing 
Investment is considered to be fundamental for any successful cases of catching up. It 
simultaneously generates demand and expands productive capacity. Also, it 
complements other elements of growth, such as technological progress, skills 
acquisition and institutional deepening.   6
China, like Japan and the Republic of Korea, could be said to have adopted an 
investment-led industrial policy. Trade expansion and a sharp increase in investment in 
physical capital and other production factors have been the major propellers of 
economic growth. China’s investment regime is characterised by a rising trend in the 
share of investment in GDP. For the past few years or so, China’s investment ratio has 
shot up, exceeding that of Japan and Korea in their heydays. Direct government 
financing, preferential interest and tax rates and favourable financing were powerful 
instruments to boost investment. The inflow of FDI further augmented the increase in 
investment into the targeted industries. The rapid expansion of non-state enterprises has 
also made the increase in investment more broad-based. 
In terms of the investment ratio, India’s first and second decades of fast growth lagged 
behind China’s. The yearly growth rates in investment differ considerably between 
China and India with the latter showing an expansionist trend but still maintaining a 
wide margin with the former. Between 2004 and 2006, the share of gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) in GDP hovered around 40 per cent for China while that of India was 
around 25 per cent. 
China enjoyed high rates of saving even in the early stage of economic reform, which 
have been intermediated predominantly through the banking system. The Chinese 
government has directed huge amounts of bank credit to infrastructure building (Wade 
2003) and for supporting SOEs, in particular before its accession to the WTO. 
Meanwhile, the domestic capital markets (bonds and stocks) remained underdeveloped. 
In order to prevent savings from leaking out abroad, strict capital control, particularly 
on outward flows, had been maintained up to a few years back. However, the relatively 
inefficient and weak financial system has not been able to intermediate effectively the 
huge domestic savings to productive investment. This may be one of the reasons for 
China’s heavy reliance on FDI.  
 
Table 1:   Contribution of household consumption, investment (gross fixed capital 
formation + changes in inventory), government consumption and net export 
to GDP growth 
1st 10 years  C  I  G  NX  GDP growth 
China 1979-89  4.93  3.32  1.37  -0.08  9.55 
India 1980-90  3.87  1.3  0.7  -0.12  5.74 
Japan 1961-71  4.55  3.88  0.63  -0.05  9.01 
Korea 1971-81  4.39  2.45  0.68  -0.21  7.3 
2nd 10 years   
China 1989-99  4.44  3.7  1.68  0.18  10 
India 1990-2000  3.78  1.19  0.72  -0.04  5.65 
Japan 1971-81  2.53  1.31  0.6  0  4.44 
Korea 1981-91  4.28  3.27 0.86 0.4  8.8 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators and Japanese Bureau of Statistics 
(Historical & MBS).  
   7
For India, whose savings rate is not as high, the government has faced severe challenges 
in using investment to boost growth. The current savings ratio of India is around 26 per 
cent. To achieve the growth target of seven to eight per cent in the coming years, the 
ratio of gross capital formation to GDP should be in the range of 29 to 33 per cent, a 
ratio similar to those in Japan, the Republic of Korea and China when they achieved the 
same per capita GDP. A higher ratio would be required if India’s average Incremental 
Capital Output Ratio rises above the average value of 4.12 which prevailed in the last 
decade. These highlight the need for India to mobilise financial resources. 
Foreign direct investment has a more important presence in China than in India. Since 
the 1990s, with its improved business environment and infrastructure, China has 
become the globe’s factory. Not only efficiency seeking but also market seeking FDI 
poured into China. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, 400 out of the 
Fortune 500 TNCs have a strong presence in China. Production sharing with more 
mature Asian economies also extended to electronics and other manufactured products. 
According to official data, 
4 the share of FFEs in total fixed capital formation increased 
from 4.2 per cent in 1991 to 10.4 per cent in 2003 and their share in total production 
output shot up from 5.3 per cent in 1991 to 27.2 per cent in 2003. While FDI is closely 
correlated to the expansion of manufacturing and trade in China, it is more closely 
linked to the service trade in India. In addition, both countries are top recipients of 
remittances in the world, slightly above US$ 20 billion for each in 2004. In the case of 
India, Diaspora remittances have for years cushioned its trade deficits.  
3  Challenges and prospects for sustaining economic growth in China and India 
History tells that it takes some sixty years for a society to move from economic takeoff 
to maturity (Rostow 1960). Low income countries tend to grow faster than mature 
economies for a long time. Then their growth rate levels off and declines drastically 
when they approach the technological frontier (Cooper 2005). Since China and India are 
not yet even halfway through the catching up period and their productivity gaps with 
leading economies are large, they are expected to enjoy high growth for the next three 
decades or more provided that no major disruptions or external shocks occur. 
In real terms, per capita GDP grew at 8.3 per cent, 7.2 per cent and 6.2 per cent for 
China, Japan and Korea during their first 20 years of takeoff. India’s performance was 
apparently lacklustre with a growth rate of 3.7 per cent in the 1980s and 90s. The less 
impressive picture in India is partly due to its high population growth, 2 per cent per 
year between 1980 and 1999 compared with 1.3 per cent in China between 1979 and 
1998. By discounting the differentials in population growth, India’s growth would have 
reached 5.8 per cent vis-à-vis 9.8 per cent for China. From 2000 to 2006, real GDP per 
capita grew at an average rate of 8.7 per cent in China. India improved its performance 
to 5.4 per cent. Thus, China has the potential to follow Korea's growth path (7.5 per cent 
throughout the third decade) while India has not yet joined the league. The fact that 
India’s economic reform started a decade later than China’s means that it would take 
India more years before it is able to deploy the full effectiveness of its growth engines.  
                                                 
4 Ministry of Commerce of China, State Statistical Bureau and China FDI Statistics.   8
Indeed, China and India have great potential to become even more important global 
players in coming years. However, both economies have exhibited certain imbalances 
and constraints that may endanger their growth sustainability. In addition, unlike Japan 
and Korea, China and India have massive populations with massive needs. To ensure 
growth momentum, efforts must be made to strengthen the current growth trend and to 
address existing problems. What follows explores some of the main challenges ahead. 
3.1 Sectoral  imbalances 
The inter-sectoral gaps between agricultural, industry and services are further widening 
in both countries. China’s service sector lags far behind industry, while India’s 
industrial growth has not been able to match the development of services. The 
contribution of agriculture to GDP in China has been declining more dramatically than 
in India, reflecting deeper industrialization and faster urbanization. However, the rural 
sector remains important to both countries, particularly because the majority of their 
populations are rural. Modernization of the agriculture sector and further urbanization 
are the answers to low agricultural productivity in China. Modernization should be 
accompanied by an increase in the welfare of the rural population, as growing affluence 
among the rural population is an important factor for the expansion of domestic demand 
for services and industrial goods. For India, the picture is different. It was largely good 
performance in agriculture and services that spurred fast GDP growth in the past 
decade. The contribution of agriculture to GDP in India is considerably larger than in 
China. Since India is more abundant in arable land than China, greater infrastructural 
investment and accelerated application of advanced technologies to promote agricultural 
growth should reap better results. 
The share of services in China’s GDP was around 41 per cent in 2004, much lower than 
60 to 70 per cent for developed economies, even lower than the 46 per cent average for 
low- and middle-income countries. There has been low capital investment in service 
sector, but over investment in the industrial sector. A gradual transformation towards a 
knowledge- and service-based economy would contribute to the sustainability of 
economic growth in China. Since 1998 the service sector has become the only source of 
new employment, and industry has entered into a period of ‘jobless growth’. Had the 
service sector developed in proportion to the manufacturing sector in the past decades, 
China’s unemployment pressure could have been mitigated. 
The imbalance between industry and services can also affect consumption and 
investment efficiency. The income elasticity of services is high while the elasticity of 
substitution between products in industry and those in services is very low. With rising 
income and a relatively underdeveloped service sector, the resultant imbalance will 
depress domestic consumption and contribute to overcapacity in industry, making 
investment less efficient. The incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) has exhibited an 
upward trend since 1992. Consequently, China has to increase its investments to 
maintain growth, negatively affecting both real income and investment returns. It could 
be said that today’s fast economic growth has been achieved, to some extent, at the 
expense of long-term sustainability.  
The story of India is just the opposite. In comparison with other low-income economies, 
both the share of industry (25 per cent) and the share of service (more than 50 per cent) 
are outside the normal range. In the past ten years, the share of industry in GDP has   9
remained constant while the share of services in GDP rose fast. Can services be the 
dominant engine of growth for closing India's gap with the leading economies? 
Probably the answer is no. It is clear that India must develop its manufacturing whose 
multiplier effect and impact on job creation are significant. For both China and India, 
there is a need to keep labour-intensive industries viable for employment generation. 
Only then, can they meet the challenges of their demographic profiles and reduce their 
pockets of poverty. 
3.2 Upgrading  technology 
By riding the tide of globalization, China and India have used their abundant human 
resources to their advantage and achieved impressive economic development. However, 
reliance on segmentation of manufacturing or splintering of services carries the risk of 
locking in the low end of the production network, which is highly commodified, highly 
standardised and non-differentiable, with a razor thin margin in many cases. In China, 
while high-tech products in overall industrial output have gained shares, most are 
owned by FFEs.  China’s IT sector (hardware) is a good example. In 2003, China 
exported IT products and components of about US$128.7 billion, but imported IT 
components worth US$91.1 billion; 70 per cent of the exports, which gives the 
impression that China is integrating extensively, but ‘shallowly’ (Steinfeld 2004). 
According to a Chinese official source, 90 per cent of high-tech exports in 2003 were 
processing trade, of which FFEs were responsible for 85.5 per cent.
5 This type of low 
value added, low return and FDI-dependent model can be vulnerable due to several 
reasons. First, it requires the importation of tremendous amount of energy and raw 
materials, which could worsen the terms of trade and lead to wage suppression in order 
to maintain price competitiveness of exports. Second, a significant amount of China’s 
imports are inputs to final stage processing or assembling. As the largest part of such 
import is exempted from customs tariffs, the accrued revenue is much less than that 
from normal trade. Third, it is difficult for domestic enterprises to maintain a healthy 
profit margin as the lead FFEs that control the core technology and brands get the lion’s 
share of profits. India’s service sector faces similar challenges, though less in 
magnitude. Agrawal and Farrell (2003) show that for every dollar that was previously 
spent on business processes in the United States and now goes to India, India earns a net 
benefit of around 33 cents, in the form of government taxes, wages paid by US 
companies, and revenues earned by Indian vendors of business process services and 
their suppliers. Fourth, in the case of China, the processing sector is liable to more 
frequent trade disputes as it relies particularly on price competitiveness and volume. 
Fifth, environmental degradation has been a constant concern with the processing 
sector. 
Japan and Korea’s dualistic road might be a good development strategy, namely 
allowing small- and medium-sized companies to flourish while paying special attention 
to the development of technology in cutting edge fields and new high value adding 
products. The centrepiece of their industrial policy has been to ensure strong technology 
upgrading through greater absorption and deepening of technologies.  
                                                 
5 http://zys.mofcom.gov.cn, Ministry of Commerce of China, ‘Rapid increase of high-tech exports does 
not mean industry structural upgrading’, 3 December 2004.   10
Having overtaken Germany in 2003, China’s manufacturing output now ranks third in 
the world behind the USA and Japan. However, patents applied in China’s 
manufacturing sector amounted to only 33 per cent of those in the USA and 25 per cent 
of those in South Korea.
6 It is clear that China is more a manufacturer than innovator. 
As more developing countries develop capacity to produce labour intensive 
manufactured goods, competition is becoming more intense. Terms of trade may worsen 
further for China and India in the coming years, thus all the more reason for China and 
India to resort to upgrading technology to maintain their economic growth. Promoting 
an intellectual elite and using education as a means to pull people out of poverty have 
been important elements of the cultures of China and India. As a result, both have the 
potential to further increase their already large supply of quality human resources to 
devote to technological upgrading. As foreign investors would normally guard and 
protect their core technology, strong incentives should be put in place to encourage 
investment in R&D and develop productivity enhancing technologies. 
3.3  Wage levels and demographic trends 
On the whole, the wage level of informal workers in China and India has failed to keep 
up with economic or productivity growth. This discourages private consumption, 
particularly during economic reform, when the social safety net has not been put in 
place. Wages should not be regarded just as a cost as they also create demand. For 
instance, remittances from migrant workers in China, estimated at around US$115 
million,
7 was an important source of income for many households in rural areas. Thus 
low wages of migrant workers have a negative impact on the demand for goods in the 
countryside. This is one major reason for the relatively unexploited rural market in 
China. When consumption could not boost economic growth to generate enough jobs to 
maintain social stability, investment was used instead. However, investment-driven 
growth often brings about overheating in certain sectors, leading to bottlenecks in the 
economy, e.g. energy shortages. It also leads to skyrocketing demand for certain 
minerals and construction materials, especially after 2002. The build up of inventories 
of enterprises would lead to further price cuts. It seems that all parties involved in the 
process, namely the government, the enterprises and the workers, are all worse off. To 
redress these problems, the government has been emphasising the importance of 
balanced economic growth, including greater reliance on consumption and investment 
efficiency. The current global economic situation does not seem to accommodate 
investment-led growth of a large economy of China’s size. So investment growth at an 
unsustainably high level should be avoided. 
Will the changing demographic profile of China affect its long-term growth? In other 
words, will the population get older before becoming rich (Eberstadt 2004)? It is true 
that the Chinese population is ageing. The ratio of the 5-24 age group to the total 
working population declined from 33 per cent in 1990 to 23 per cent in 2005, and it will 
keep decreasing in the next few decades. Thus, it is expected that the new labour supply 
will decrease, leading to higher labour costs. Further, over the next three decades, a 12 
per cent increase is anticipated in the group aged over 65, accompanied by a 5 per cent 
                                                 
6 China Daily, ‘Manufacturing to continue rapid expansion’, 21 March 2005. 
7 www.xinhuanet.com, accessed 23 November 2006.   11
decrease in the group aged under-14. Clearly, the extent to which less spending on 
school education can offset the increasing cost of taking care of the elderly deserves 
closer examination. According to Sin (2005), future pension liabilities for China could 
reach 140 per cent of GDP. India will be in a better position than China as its prime age 
workers will increase and the share of the working age population is expected to rise 
until 2045. 
4 Summary 
The time required for poor and populous countries to integrate themselves into the 
world economy and catch up with lead economies is inevitably long. The marriage of 
foreign direct investment with low cost, yet educated, labour in China and India enabled 
them to shorten the industrialization process. This could not have happened at a time 
when capital was less mobile or when segmentation of global manufacturing and 
services had not taken place. Nor could this happen without market-oriented reforms 
and trade liberalization that improve the incentive mechanism and encourage factor 
flows to more productive sectors. To emulate China’s and India’s catch-up experience, 
developing countries should identify their comparative and absolute advantages and 
adopt necessary reforms to bring them into full play. By doing so, an investment-profit 
nexus can emerge to speed up capital accumulation. However, willingness to share 
economic gains with international players should not prevent developing countries from 
building up their own institutional and technological capabilities. 
A sharp decline in the dependency ratio trigged economic growth in China and India, as 
was the case for Japan and the Republic of Korea. Manufacturing, which contributed to 
rapid growth in Japan and the Republic of Korea, has also played the same role in 
China. The rapid growth of manufacturing and labour productivity, the high investment 
rate and fast trade expansion constitute a virtuous circle.  In the case of India, the 
virtuous circle is apparent in the IT service sector, but is not as profound in 
manufacturing. International trade served as a vent of surplus. Both imports and exports 
are important for growth. 
To sustain rapid economic growth, China and India must redress a multitude of 
imbalances and challenges. Though manufacturing and services have been the growth 
engines of the two countries respectively, it seems lopsided development could 
constitute a constraint to more broad based growth. China needs to boost the service 
sector in order to generate jobs and expand domestic demand, while India needs the 
manufacturing sector to stimulate economic growth. The insertion into the international 
supply chain carries the risks of locking into low end and labour intensive 
manufacturing or service provision if relying too much on foreign capital and 
technology. Thus, technology upgrading is essential for their long-term economic 
growth. Balancing consumption and savings is also crucial as investment generated 
demand may lose its effectiveness if domestic consumption is sluggish. To shift fiscal 
spending towards health, education and social security could reduce precautionary 
savings. It is therefore important to allow wage levels to keep pace with productivity 
growth. The declining dependency ratio, particularly in China, appeals for policy 
initiatives to avoid a scenario of becoming old before getting rich.   12
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